How savings can lower economic growth levels: the U.S. case by De Koning, Kees
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
How savings can lower economic growth
levels: the U.S. case
Kees De Koning
26 April 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/78806/
MPRA Paper No. 78806, posted 27 April 2017 08:22 UTC
	 1	
																																																																									How	savings	can	lower	economic	growth	levels:	the	U.S.	case©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning										
____________________________________________________________________________________________	
	
	
	
How	savings	can	lower	economic	growth	levels:	the	U.S.	case.	
	
																																				
	
By	
	
Drs	Kees	De	Koning	
	
26th	April	2017	
	
	
_______________________________________________________________________________	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 2	
																																																																											How	savings	can	lower	economic	growth	levels:	the	U.S.	case©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning	
	
	
Table	of	contents	
																																																																																																																																													Page		Introduction																																																																																																																											3			1.	Households’	wealth	in	the	U.S																																																																																						4					1.1	Some	key	data																																																																																																														4					1.2	Differences	affecting	wealthy	households	and	those	on											income	only	ones																																																																																																									4			2.	The	past	experience																																																																																																										5			3.	The	relationship	between	mortgage	borrowing,	income	developments						and	house	prices																																																																																																																	6			4.	How	the	U.S.	financial	crisis	could	have	been	averted																																													9			References																																																																																																																																12																																																											
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 3	
	
																																																How	savings	can	lower	economic	growth	levels:	the	U.S.	case©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning	
	
Introduction	
	Why	is	it	that	the	rich	seem	to	get	richer	over	time	and	the	poor	cannot	keep	up	with	them?	This	is	not	only	the	situation	in	the	U.S.	but	also	in	countries	like	the	U.K.,	Germany,	France	and	Italy.	Wealth	distribution	is	even	more	unequal	than	income	 distribution.	 For	 instance,	 in	 the	 U.S.	 according	 to	 the	 U.S	 Census	Bureau1,	median	net	worth	increased	between	2000	and	2011	for	households	in	the	 top	 two	quintiles	of	 the	net	worth	distribution	(the	wealthiest	40	percent),	while	declining	 for	 those	 in	 the	 lower	 three	quintiles	 (the	bottom	60	percent).	The	result	was	a	widening	wealth	gap	between	those	at	the	top	and	those	in	the	middle	and	bottom	of	the	net	worth	distribution.		The	Census	Bureau’s	Distribution	of	Household	Wealth	in	the	U.S.:	2000	to	2011,	states	that	the	median	household	net	worth	decreased	by	$5,124	for	households	in	 the	 first	 (bottom)	 net	 worth	 quintile	 and	 increased	 by	 $61,379	 (or	 10.8	percent)	for	those	in	the	highest	(top)	quintile.	Median	net	worth	of	households	in	the	highest	quintile	was	39.8	times	higher	than	the	second	lowest	quintile	in	2000,	and	it	rose	to	86.8	times	higher	in	2011.		Could	there	be	a	link	between	debt	levels,	especially	of	the	long-term	variety	of	home	 mortgages,	 and	 wealth	 inequality	 levels?	 From	 the	 116.8	 million	 U.S.	households	 in	 2008,	 73.6	 million	 had	 a	 mortgage	 in	 that	 year,	 or	 63%	 of	 all	households.	33.3%	of	the	73.6	million	households	faced	foreclosure	proceedings	against	 them	during	 the	period	2005-2015.	The	bottom	40%	of	 all	 households	owned	 less	 than	0.1%	of	all	U.S.	wealth,	 the	 top	1%	owned	35.5%	and	 the	 top	20%	owned	87%	of	all	assets.		In	servicing	mortgage	debt,	households	on	a	lower	income	level	have	only	their	income	 to	 fall	 back	on,	while	 the	wealthier	households,	 can	 -if	 needed-	 service	debt	 from	 accumulated	 assets.	 This	 difference	 between	 households	 has	 major	implications	for	the	economic	consequences	of	excessive	lending	practices.	 In	a	paper:	 “How	 the	 U.S.	 financial	 crisis	 could	 have	 been	 averted”2,	 this	 author	analyses	 a	 link	 between	 income	 and	 mortgage	 debt	 and	 the	 consequences	 of	ignoring	such	income	link.		The	consequence	is	that	mortgagors	experience	a	depreciation	of	the	U.S.	dollar	in	the	event	house	prices	rise	faster	than	income	levels,	thereby	impairing	their	future	income	capacity	to	spend	on	other	goods	and	services.					
																																																									1	https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2014/cb14-156.html	2	https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/77060/	
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1.		Household’s	wealth	in	the	U.S.	
	
1.1	Some	key	data.	
	By	 the	end	of	1996,	 the	99.63	million	U.S.	households	had	a	 total	net	worth	of	$30.9	 trillion3,	 or	 $310,150	 per	 household.	 By	 2016	 the	 total	 net	 worth	 had	grown	to	$92.8	 trillion	and	 the	number	of	households	had	 increased	 to	125.82	million.	The	net	worth	per	household	grew	on	average	to	$737,600	by	the	end	of	2016.	 Per	 household,	 net	worth	 rose	 to	 an	 impressive	 238%	over	 the	 twenty-year	period.		Non-financial	 assets	 grew	 from	$11.985	 trillion	 to	 $32.431	 trillion,	 reflecting	 a	growth	 rate	 of	 270%.	 Financial	 assets	 grew	 from	 $24.349	 trillion	 to	 $75.478	trillion	over	the	same	period		-a	growth	rate	of	310%.		The	accumulation	of	assets	indicates	an	impressive	growth	rate	on	average,	but	the	average	did	not	reflect	the	developments	for	those	who	had	to	borrow	to	get	on	the	property	ladder.		In	2008,	the	U.S.	had	116.78	million	households	and	73.58	million	of	them	had	a	mortgage.	The	average	mortgage	was	$142,700	or	nearly	three	times	the	median	earnings	per	household	in	2008.	When	over	60%	of	all	households	in	the	U.S.	are	exposed	 to	mortgage	 risks,	 one	has	 to	 consider	 the	 links	between	 income	only	households	and	income	and	wealth	levels	for	the	others.	The	borrowers	were	–to	a	 very	 large	 degree-	 income	 earner	 only	with	 a	 low	 level	 of	 financial	 assets,	 if	any.		The	 Statista	 Portal 4 	has	 published	 data	 both	 on	 income	 and	 on	 wealth	distribution	 in	 the	 U.S.	 Over	 2016,	 the	 wealthiest	 1%	 of	 the	 U.S.	 households	owned	35.5%	of	 the	country’s	wealth	 level.,	 the	 top	20%	of	households	owned	87%.	On	the	other	hand	the	bottom	40%	of	U.S.	households	were	in	debt	or	had	practically	 no	 share	 in	 the	 country’s	 wealth.	 On	 income,	 the	 top	 1%	 had	 a	combined	 income	 of	 $1.64	 trillion	 in	 2014,	 while	 the	 bottom	 40%	 earned	 a	combined	income	of	$1.58	trillion	in	the	same	year.		
1.2	 Differences	 affecting	 wealthy	 households	 and	 those	 on	 income	 only	
ones		The	difference	between	a	wealthy	household	and	one	in	the	bottom	40%	is	that	the	 latter	 have	 to	 resort	 to	 borrowing	 in	 order	 to	 get	 a	 foot	 on	 the	 housing	ladder.	Wealth	invested	in	shares	and	bonds	carries	the	risk	of	losing	value	in	the	event	of	lower	share	or	bond	prices.	The	wealth	owner	experiences	a	paper	loss.																																																										3	https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/19980911/z1r-5.pdf	4	https://www.statista.com/statistics/203961/wealth-distribution-for-the-us/	
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																																																			How	savings	can	lower	economic	growth	levels:	the	U.S.	case©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning			If	 the	 share	or	bond	prices	 improve,	 the	owner	experiences	a	paper	gain.	Only	the	act	of	actually	selling	or	buying	shares	or	bonds	fixes	prices.	Only	when	such	transactions	take	place	are	real	gains	or	losses	recorded.		Savings,	a	wealth	category,	which	via	banks	and	other	financial	institutions,	can	be	 converted	 into	 mortgages,	 have	 different	 terms	 and	 conditions.	 Firstly	 a	mortgage	 is	 a	 term	 loan,	 rather	 than	 an	 open-ended	 instrument	 that	 can	 be	traded	 daily	 on	 the	 financial	 markets.	 There	 is	 no	 daily	 market	 price	 for	 a	mortgage,	notwithstanding	that	the	securitization	of	mortgage	portfolios	tried	to	establish	 such	 a	 collective	 market	 price.	 The	 latter	 exercise	 ended	 in	 abject	failure,	due	to	the	quality	mix	of	such	mortgages.		Secondly,	banks	do	not	behave	like	wealthy	owners	of	an	asset.	They	don’t	wait	to	see	whether	a	mortgagor	might	become	capable	again	to	service	their	debt,	if	the	 latter	 fails	 to	 keep	 up	 with	 the	 payments	 on	 the	 term	 loan.	 Banks	 also	arrange	for	the	property	to	be	used	as	collateral.		Thirdly,	 banks	 and	 other	 financial	 institutions	 compete	 for	 business.	 The	collective	of	banks	were	acting	like	lemmings	running	over	a	cliff	in	the	run	up	to	2007.	No	lending	restraints	seem	to	have	been	applied	from	1999	on.	On	top	of	this,	 from	 2004	 mortgage	 risks	 were	 increasingly	 sold	 to	 investors	 through	mortgage-backed	securities.		A	mortgage	borrower	who	no	 longer	has	 the	necessary	 income	 to	 support	 the	debt	 servicing	 of	 his/her	 mortgage,	 does	 not	 only	 make	 a	 loss	 on	 paper,	 but	suffers	an	actual	reduction	in	income	and	may	lose	past	savings	accumulated	in	the	value	of	the	home	as	well:	a	double	whammy.		It	is	this	vital	difference	between	savings	used	for	own	investments	and	savings	allocated	to	help	the	lower	income	classes	to	acquire	a	home	by	taking	on	a	loan-servicing	obligation.		
	
2.	The	past	experience	
	In	 the	 paper:	 “How	 the	 U.S.	 financial	 crisis	 could	 have	 been	 averted”,	 the	underlying	 financial	 and	 other	 statistics	 were	 discussed.	 Firstly,	 the	 annual	volume	of	home	mortgage	 lending	was	calculated	on	 the	basis	 that	 the	 lending	volume	 consists	 of	 two	 elements:	 (i)	 the	 net	 increase/decrease	 in	 outstanding	mortgage	 amounts	 as	 provided	 in	 the	 Balance	 Sheet	 of	 Households	 and	Nonprofit	 Organizations	 as	 published	 quarterly	 by	 the	 Federal	 Reserve	 in	 St.	Louis5,	 and	 (ii)	 the	 annual	 volume	 of	 repayments	 of	 outstanding	 mortgages,	replaced	by	new	mortgages.																																																									5	https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/html/b101.htm	
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																																																		How	savings	can	lower	economic	growth	levels:	the	U.S.	case©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning			In	 total,	 these	 two	 elements	 combined,	 reflect	 the	 volume	 of	 new	 mortgages	written	each	single	year.	In	above	study,	such	volumes	were	reflected	in	the	time	series	from	1996-2016.		The	volume	of	mortgage	lending	can	have	an	effect	on	the	annual	volume	of	new	housing	starts	as	well	as	on	the	average	home	sales	price	in	the	U.S.			Statistics	for	the	Annual	Housing	Starts	and	average	U.S.	Home	Sales	Price	were	provided	in	the	paper	over	the	same	period.	Statistics	for	the	Median	Household	Nominal	Income	were	also	given	as	an	indication	of	the	affordability	of	mortgage	payments.	1996	was	chosen	as	the	start	date.	During	1996,	housing	starts	were	roughly	in	line	with	the	population	growth	level.	Secondly,	the	average	home	sale	prices	were	close	to	the	income	affordability	level.	For	the	subsequent	20	years,	the	 affordable	 level	 of	 average	 house	 prices	 was	 calculated	 on	 basis	 of	 the	growth	level	in	the	nominal	Median	Household	Income.		In	 1996,	 the	 annual	 volume	 of	 new	 home	 loans	 amounted	 to	 $329	 billion.	 By	2003,	 the	 volume	 had	 increased	 to	 $1.112	 trillion.	 The	 $329	 billion	 was	accompanied	by	1.370	million	new	housing	 starts.	By	2003,	 the	$1.112	 trillion	meant	 2.057	million	new	homes	being	 started.	 Incidentally,	 2003	was	 also	 the	top	year	for	new	housing	starts	during	the	whole	period	1996-2016.		The	 key	 characteristic	 of	 the	 period	 1996-2007	 was	 a	 rapid	 growth	 in	 the	volume	 of	 home	 mortgage	 lending,	 especially	 between	 1997	 and	 2003,	 and	remained	 at	 or	 above	 the	 2003	 level	 until	 2007.	 The	 second	 defining	characteristic	was	that	the	volume	of	lending	had	a	substantial	effect	on	average	house	 prices,	 taking	 them	 far	 above	 the	 affordable	 level	 on	 basis	 of	 nominal	median	 income	growth	 levels.	Over	 this	period,	nominal	median	 incomes	grew	much	more	slowly	than	the	average	house	prices.				
3.	 The	 relationship	 between	 mortgage	 borrowing,	 income	 developments	
and	house	prices	
	Nearly	 all	 households	 that	 have	 to	 borrow	 to	 acquire	 a	 home	 are	 in	 the	 lower	three	quintiles	(lower	60%	of	 income	brackets).	 	This	means	that	 they	are	also	nearly	 all	 in	 the	 lower	 wealth	 categories.	 As	 stated	 above,	 the	 lowest	 two	quintiles	 –the	 bottom	 40%	 of	 households-	 own	 practically	 nothing	 of	 the	 U.S.	wealth	levels.	At	least	this	was	the	status	in	2014	and	early	indications	are	that	only	a	slight	improvement	has	taken	place	since.		When	 income	 is	 practically	 the	 only	 source	 of	 servicing	 debt	 levels,	 it	 makes	sense	 to	compare	 income	growth	with	prices.	This	 is	done	extensively	 through	measuring	consumer	price	developments	with	income	growth.	
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																																														How	savings	can	lower	economic	growth	levels:	the	U.S.	case©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning			What	 has	 been	 missing	 so	 far,	 or	 has	 been	 ignored	 to	 take	 into	 account	 for	economic	 strategy	 purposes,	 is	 to	 compare	 income	 growth	 with	 house	 price	inflation	 levels.	 In	 most	 countries,	 including	 in	 the	 U.S.,	 house	 prices	 are	compared	 to	 incomes.	 The	 (average)	 house	 price	 is	 divided	 by	 the	 current	income	and	a	multiple	is	established.	What	–to	my	knowledge-	has	not	been	done	is	 to	relate	 the	annual	volume	of	mortgage	 lending	with	 the	changes	 in	 income	levels	over	time.				The	 consequences	 of	 house	 prices	 rising	 faster	 than	 the	 growth	 in	 incomes	include	a	depreciation	in	the	value	of	each	U.S.	dollar	used	for	acquiring	a	(new)	home.	If	mortgage	borrowings	are	used	to	assist	a	household	in	acquiring	a	home	and	 such	 household	 is	 depending	 on	 future	 income	 flows	 to	 repay	 such	mortgage,	 then,	by	definition,	 the	values	of	 future	 income	flows	are	reduced	by	the	 depreciation	 in	 current	 values	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 excess	 house	 price	inflation	 levels	over	 income	growth	 levels.	Less	affordability	means	 that	 for	all	entrants	to	the	housing	market	a	larger	share	of	income	needs	to	be	allocated	to	acquire	a	home:	this	translates	to	depreciation	in	the	value	of	each	borrowed	U.S.	dollar	 used.	 Such	 depreciation	 applies	 equally	 to	 tenants.	 Rents,	 generally	speaking,	do	go	up	in	line	with	house	price	inflation.	If	potential	mortgagors	can	no	longer	afford	to	buy,	their	only	alternative	is	to	rent.		From	a	lenders	point	of	view,	no	depreciation	in	the	value	of	a	dollar	lend	takes	place.	 This	 is	 because	 each	 dollar	 returned	 from	 a	 mortgagor	 has	 the	 same	purchasing	 power	 for	 consumer	 goods	 and	 services	 as	 it	 had	 before	 the	mortgage	 transaction.	 	 Lenders	 –banks	 and	 indirectly	 other	 households	supplying	 the	 funds-	 are	 compensated	 with	 an	 interest	 margin	 for	 their	mortgage	provision.	Landlords	are	equally	compensated	through	higher	rentals.		The	key	 to	understanding	 the	economic	events	over	 the	period	1996-2007	are	reflected	in	this	difference	in	the	dollar	values	of	future	incomes	for	households	acting	 as	 borrowers	 or	 tenants	 and	 those	 that	 supply	 the	 monies.	 The	households	needing	to	borrow	to	get	onto	the	housing	ladder	as	well	as	tenants	see	 their	 future	 incomes	 reduced	 by	 the	 excessive	 growth	 of	 house	 prices	 as	compared	to	income	levels.	On	the	other	hand	banks	and	indirectly	households	who	provide	the	funds	do	not	experience	a	similar	decline	in	disposable	incomes.	The	depreciation	risks	 in	dollar	values	–the	relative	reduction	in	future	 income	flows-	are	clearly	sat	with	the	households	that	can	least	afford	it.		House	 price	 rises	 above	 average	 income	 growth	 levels	 -as	 was	 the	 case	 from	1999-2007-	undermine	future	income	flows	of	all	mortgagors,	but	especially	the	current	and	potential	future	borrowers.	They	also	undermine	the	future	incomes	of	all	tenants.	House	price	rises	can	be	caused	by	two	factors:	a	shortage	of	new	homes	being	constructed	-the	U.K.	case-	or	like	in	the	case	of	the	U.S.,	a	sufficient	level	 of	 new	 homes	 coming	 on	 the	 market	 with	 an	 excessive	 amount	 of	mortgages	attached	to	these	homes.		
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																																																																									How	savings	can	lower	economic	growth	levels:	the	U.S.	case©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning			Bankers	and	regulators	should	base	their	actions	not	on	whether	the	banks	will	survive	 a	 house	price	 crash,	 but	whether	 the	mortgage	borrowers	will	 survive	such	 a	 crash.	 The	 latter	 determine	 future	 economic	 growth	 rates,	 while	 the	banking	 sector	 has	 the	 ability	 -by	 excessive	 lending	 practices-	 to	 cause	 such	 a	crash.			In	this	context,	questions	should	be	raised	as	to	why	banks	and	regulators	rely	so	heavily	on	the	collateral	values	of	homes	as	security	for	their	mortgages.	When	the	 financial	 sector	oversupplied	households	with	mortgage	 funds	 –as	was	 the	case	from	1999-2007-,	house	prices	rose	faster	than	income	levels.	The	collateral	values	were	 inflated	 thereby	distorting	 loan	 to	asset	values.	Credit	 risks	go	up,	rather	 than	come	down	under	such	a	scenario.	What	 is	worse,	of	course,	 is	 the	unwinding	 of	 such	 an	 overfunding	 situation,	 which	 happened	 from	 2007	 to	2015.		6.1	million	homes	were	repossessed	over	the	period	2006-2015.	Such	an	unwinding	process	is	economically	toxic.	Many	jobs	were	lost;	only	by	2012	did	the	 household	 median	 nominal	 income	 level	 surpass	 the	 2007	 level;	 over	 the	whole	period	2007-2016	new	housing	starts	never	reached	the	moderate	level	of	1.370	million	of	1996.	House	prices	started	rising,	especially	from	2013	on,	not	because	of	an	oversupply	of	new	housing	starts,	but	rather	as	a	consequence	of	the	opposite	movement.	Such	undersupply	particularly	affects	the	lower	income	groups	 as	 ownership	 becomes	 an	 even	more	 distant	 dream	 and	 rentals	 go	 up	faster	 than	 incomes.	 The	 gap	 between	 high	 and	 low-income	 classes	 –both	 in	terms	 of	 disposable	 income	 and	 in	 wealth	 levels-	 was	further	widened	 as	 a	consequence	 of	 this	 whole	 cycle.	 Economic	 growth	 levels	 were	 significantly	stymied.		Regulators	need	to	oversee	that	the	link	between	income	growth	and	house	price	inflation	 is	 not	 caused	 by	 excessive	 lending	 actions	 by	 the	 banking	 system.	Excessive	 lending	 is	defined	as	causing	house	prices	 to	 rise	 faster	 than	 income	growth	levels.		The	main	driver	 for	U.S.	house	prices	 rising	 faster	 than	 income	 levels	over	 the	period	1996-2003	was	not	that	there	was	a	shortage	of	homes	for	sale	as	actual	housing	 starts	moved	up	 from	1.370	million	 in	 1996	 to	 2.057	million	 in	 2003,	rather	the	volume	of	mortgage	lending	grew	from	$329	billion	in	1996	to	$1.112	trillion	by	2003.			The	consequence	of	 this	 lending	spree	was	 that	many	households	 in	 the	 lower	income	 groups	 saw	 their	 disposable	 income	 reduced,	 after	 mortgage	 debt	servicing.	In	the	paper:	“How	the	U.S.	financial	crisis	could	have	been	averted”,	it	was	calculated	that	by	2003	the	cumulative	impact	over	the	period	1999,	when	this	 started,	 to	 2003	was	 $2.19	 trillion,	 which	 represented	 31.7%	 of	 the	 total	mortgage	level	outstanding	at	the	time.																																																																											
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																																																																											How	savings	can	lower	economic	growth	levels:	the	U.S.	case©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning			Economic	thinking	during	the	period	1996-2003	was	flawed	in	several	respects.	Lenders	based	judgments	on	households’	income	projections	over	the	coming	30	years	and	on	the	loan	to	asset	values	as	a	fall	back	position	in	the	event	that	their	borrower	 clients	 could	 no	 longer	 service	 their	 mortgage	 debts.	 When	 the	collective	of	banks	influence	the	price	level	of	homes	by	heavily	increasing	their	collective	lending	levels,	they,	in	a	manner	of	speaking,	were	creating	their	own	source	of	repayment;	bypassing	the	core	notion	of	affordability	on	the	part	of	the	obligors.	The	regulators	made	another	key	misjudgment.	 	They	failed	to	see	the	dangers	of	 the	 resultant	depreciation	 in	 the	value	of	 the	dollar	 in	 the	hands	of	real	 estate	 debtors.	 This	 manifested	 itself	 in	 a	 reduced	 level	 of	 disposable	household	income,	a	material	 factor	 in	a	 future	slow	down	in	economic	growth	levels.		The	use	of	 the	 interest	rate	 instrument	does	not	correct	past	mortgage	 lending	excesses.	In	case	of	a	rate	increase,	the	results	are	rather	the	opposite	of	what	is	intended:	households	have	to	pay	more	for	having	a	similar	size	mortgage	as	in	the	 past,	 thereby	 further	 reducing	 their	 disposable	 income	 levels.	 Mortgage	lending	volume	control	measures	were	needed	by	2003,	 influencing	bankers	to	collectively	 lend	 less,	 but	 not	 by	 simultaneously	 increasing	 the	 costs	 of	 a	mortgage	to	households.	It	did	not	help	that	the	effective	Fed	funds	rate	went	up	from	1%	in	 January	2004	to	5.25%	by	May	2007.	On	 top	of	 this,	bankers	were	able	 to	 postpone	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 interest	 rate	 increase	 by	 providing	 100%	mortgages,	or	by	 low	start	up	interest	rate	mortgages	for	a	 few	years,	 followed	by	a	steep	rate	hike	 thereafter.	Only	by	2007,	did	 the	annual	mortgage	 lending	volume	drop	slightly	as	compared	to	the	high	mortgage	lending	volume	of	2003.																																																				
4	How	the	U.S.	financial	crisis	could	have	been	averted.	
		The	U.S.	financial	crisis	has	often	been	regarded	as	a	banking	crisis,	which	it	was	in	2007-2008.	However	 the	real	 crisis	was	a	households’	 income	related	crisis,	which	preceded	the	financial	crisis	by	at	least	four	years.			The	 households’	 income	 related	 crisis	 was	 -in	 the	 U.S.	 case-	 caused	 by	 the	collective	banking	sector	increasing	annual	mortgage	volumes	from	$341	billion	in	1997	to	$1.112	trillion	 in	2003.	This	single	 factor	caused	U.S.	average	house	prices	 to	rise	 from	$176,200	 in	1997	to	$246,300	 in	2003.	No	shortage	of	new	housing	 starts	 were	 experienced	 in	 that	 U.S.	 population	 growth	 needed	approximately	1.6	million	new	homes	and	2.057	new	homes	were	started	to	be	built	in	2003.	The	$246,300	average	home	sales	price	in	2003	should	be	seen	in	the	 context	 of	 an	 affordable	 average	 home	 sales	 price	 of	 $203,089,	 the	 latter	price	was	based	on	the	increases	in	Nominal	Median	Household	Income	over	the	period	1997-2003.		In	 ignoring	 the	real	 reason	of	 the	economic	crisis,	policy	makers	made	matters	worth	over	the	period	2003-2007.	In	order	to	slow	down	the	volume	of		
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																																																																										How	savings	can	lower	economic	growth	levels:	the	U.S.	case©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning		mortgage	 lending,	 the	 Fed	 raised	 the	 base	 rate	 from	 1%	 in	 January	 2004	 to	5.25%	 by	 May	 2007.	 A	 major	 interest	 rate	 hike	 in	 the	 costs	 of	 a	 mortgage	 is	supposed	to	slow	down	lending	volumes.	It	did	not	work	as	mortgage	volumes	in	2004,	2005	and	2006	all	 exceeded	 the	very	high	 level	of	2003.	Secondly,	 if	 the	real	crisis	was	a	household	income	related	crisis	caused	through	a	depreciation	of	 the	 dollar	 for	 mortgage	 borrowers	 and	 tenants,	 then	 an	 interest	 rate	 costs	increase	 only	 serves	 to	 exacerbate	 such	 depreciation	 level.	 Bankers	 further	postponed	the	day	of	reckoning	by	 increasing	the	 level	of	subprime	mortgages,	especially	 during	 the	 period	 2004-2007.	 They	 also	 devised	 mortgage-based	derivative	products	that	did	not	 immediately	reflect	the	changes	 in	the	costs	of	funds.		Over	the	period	1997-2007,	all	these	actions	–or	lack	of	them-	by	the	Fed	and	the	collective	of	banks	made	the	depreciation	of	 future	 incomes	of	mortgagors	and	tenants	 go	 much	 deeper	 than	 was	 safe	 for	 a	 stable	 and	 continued	 economic	growth	pattern.	Households	in	the	lower	income	brackets	were	made	to	absorb	a	higher	and	higher	 level	of	housing	 costs,	 far	 above	 their	 income	growth	 levels,	leaving	them	with	a	reduced	level	of	income	to	be	deployed	for	the	consumption	of	consumer	goods	and	services.	The	excessive	conversion	 level	of	savings	 into	mortgage	 lending	 led	to	this	disastrous	outcome.	The	utilization	of	savings	was	undermining	economic	growth	levels.	The	same	process	also	led	to	widening	the	gap	between	the	rich	and	the	poor	as	the	latter	were	–by	necessity-	the	mortgage	borrowers	or	tenants.																																																																														In	previous	papers	by	 this	author	some	obvious	solutions	were	suggested.	 It	 is	useful	to	highlight	that	the	household	income	crisis	and	its	mortgage	crisis	in	the	U.S.	was	not	caused	by	a	single	bank	or	a	few	banking	or	financial	institutions;	it	was	 caused	 by	 the	 collective	 financial	 sector	 and	 failures	 by	 the	 regulators	 to	intervene	effectively.	Competition	between	banks	can	never	solve	such	a	crisis,	only	supervisory	guidance	can.		It	 was	 suggested	 that	 a	 “traffic	 light	 system”	 could	 work,	 indicating	 to	 all	financial	 institutions	 operating	 in	 the	 mortgage	 markets	 that	 the	 economic	growth	factors	were	not	under	threat	–the	green	light-;	were	entering	the	danger	zone	 –the	 amber	 light	 system-	 or	 were	 under	 serious	 threat	 –the	 red	 light	warning	 system-.	 If	 combined	with	 reserve	 requirements	 and/or	 penalties	 for	those	 institutions	 most	 aggressive	 in	 their	 lending	 behavior,	 the	 collective	lending	behavior	could	be	adjusted	so	that	house	price	inflation	would	follow	the	speed	of	income	growth	in	society.		The	 second	 suggestion	 was	 for	 a	 correction	 mechanism	 in	 case	 the	 lending	pattern	had	 run	out	of	hand.	 Its	 aim	would	be	 to	 ensure	 that	most	of	 the	24.5	million	 households	 who	 faced	 foreclosure	 proceedings,	 would	 be	 helped	 by	 a	government	owned	institution	-A	National	Mortgage	Bank	was	suggested-.	Such	help	would	be	to	alleviate	the	cash	flow	problems	encountered	by	households	as	a	consequence	of	the	excessive	mortgage	lending	volumes	in	previous	times.	
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																																																																								How	savings	can	lower	economic	growth	levels:	the	U.S.	case©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning			A	subordinated	mortgage	element	could	be	introduced	to	protect	taxpayers	from	excessive	risks.	On	the	other	hand	an	element	of	temporary	subsidy	could	also	be	built	 into	such	program.	Banks	could	be	forced	to	pay	into	such	system	as	they	benefit	from	the	reduction	in	risks	over	their	outstanding	mortgage	portfolio.		If	 such	a	 curative	 system	had	been	 in	place	 from	2007	onwards,	 the	 economic	downturn	would	have	been	much	less	severe.	 It	would	have	helped	to	stabilize	the	 financial	 position	 of	most	 households	 under	 threat,	 thereby	 alleviating	 the	excessive	 pressure	 by	 banks	 to	 recoup	 their	 outstanding	 mortgage	 loans.	Disposable	 income	 levels	 for	 the	 lower	 income	 groups	 would	 have	 been	 less	affected	 and	 the	 threat	 to	 economic	 growth	 levels,	 reduced.	 Companies	would	have	had	less	reason	to	lay	off	millions	of	workers,	as	demand	levels	would	have	been	stabilized.		The	 experience	 of	 extremely	 low	 interest	 rates	 since	 2007	 did	 not	 induce	households	 to	 borrow	 more,	 rather	 the	 opposite.	 Households	 reduced	 their	outstanding	 mortgage	 volume	 by	 over	 $1	 trillion	 over	 the	 period	 2007-2016.	Again,	an	undesirable	development	when	the	number	of	households	are	growing	and	 the	need	 for	new	housing	 starts	 requires	around	1.6	million	new	homes	a	year.	 Over	 the	 period	 2008-2016	 only	 7.827	million	 new	 housing	 starts	 were	made	 rather	 than	 the	 needed	 14.4	 million	 units.	 The	 oversupply	 of	 mortgage	funds	 was	 followed	 by	 an	 undersupply	 period	 in	 the	 years	 after	 2008.	 Both	situations	are	undesirable	from	the	point	of	view	of	steady	economic	growth.			In	 summary,	 more	 stable	 economic	 growth	 can	 be	 achieved	 if	 the	 protective	regulatory	 focus	 is	 shifted	 onto	mortgage	borrowers	 and	 tenants,	 especially	 in	regulating	the	relationship	between	income	levels	and	house	price	growth.	This	will	help	to	avoid	the	situation	where	the	value	of	a	borrower/tenant’s	money	is	depreciated	 disproportionately	 with	 potential	 damaging	 consequences	 for	 the	broader	 economy.	 Income	and	wealth	distribution	would	benefit	 from	 such	 an	approach.				26th	April	2017			Drs	Kees	De	Koning	Chorleywood		U.K.					
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